Beneficence and maleficence
The "nihil nocere" principle requires us to base therapeutic decisions on a (tentative) risk/benefit analysis.'0 Since there is no effective therapy without potential harm (complementary therapies are often promoted as natural and wrongly equated with harmless), this issue relates to the net benefit that a remedy will predictably bring to a given patient. In CM such a risk/benefit analysis is rarely possible, because neither the potential benefits nor the risks have been investigated to the full.4 I In medicine we often have to rely on educated guesses and we may become so confident in our guesswork that we confuse opinion with evidence"; in CM, where evidence is more scarce than in mainstream medicine, therapeutic decisions are more likely to be based on opinion rather than evidence.
To avoid ethical problems arising from this fact, one must be quite clear and outspoken about beneficence and maleficence towards the patient. With sad regularity, fatalities following the use of CM are reported in the medical literature, for example"3 which should remind us that the issue is not theoretical or academic, but real and burning. To avoid future ethical dilemmas in this situation, the need for rigorous research to fill the present gaps in our knowledge cannot be stressed often enough.4
In addition to these direct risks of CM, there is the possibility of harm through malpractice and incompetence (much as with any other type of medicine). As formal training and regulation of complementary practitioners are often insufficient or non-existent, this problem seems to be more prevalent than in other areas of medicine.9 From the point of view of medical ethics it therefore seems essential that professional standards be adopted by non-medically qualified practitioners.'3 Providing medical treatment, including alternative medical treatment, presupposes that the physician in question possesses diagnostic competence.5 Professional competence, it seems is a "sine qua non" also for non-medically qualified practitioners.
Justice
In relation to CM, the fair distribution of the (usually finite) resources for complementary therapies may represent a problem. In a simplified model of a health care system, spending money on anything that is in addition to usual care (the data available clearly indicate that CM is used mostly as an adjunct, rather than an alternative to mainstream medicine) may mean that these resources will subsequently not be available elsewhere. Therefore the subject of rationing has become topical in health care,'4 and its ethical implications are receiving more attention. Negligence of the cost issue can deprive patients of care from which they would benefit more; this is both inefficient and unethical. '5 At present there is no compelling evidence to support the notion that the integration of CM into a health care system would save money.'6 Increasing the funds available would be the optimal way to cope with additional costs, but this is rarely possible. Therefore therapies (and diagnostic procedures) have to be judged by their relative merit, which creates a host of potential dilemmas. How, for instance, would one weigh the merit of an orthodox treatment (say to alleviate pain in arthritis) against a complementary option that increases well-being? To do this, one would require sound data on prevalence, effectiveness, safety, costs, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility. However, such data are at present not available. Therefore 
